No one should be arrested for giving the finger to a police officer.

Manhattan, NY. - The man who is suing the city after being arrested in Greenwich Village last summer for giving cops the middle finger said the gesture was meant as “a private laugh with myself,” and not an attack on the NYPD.

Robert Bell, 26, a financial services recruiter, said that when he saw several police officers outside the Slaughtered Lamb Pub on Bleecker Street in August of 2011, he waited until their backs were turned to flip them the bird.

But another police officer who had been lagging behind the group witnessed Bell’s gesture and arrested him on the spot.

It was early in the evening, and Bell had a few drinks in him but was far from intoxicated, he told DNAinfo.com New York. When asked why he'd raised his middle finger to the passing officers, Bell said he did it “because I don’t like cops,” according to the lawsuit.

“I don’t know what laws they’ve made up in their head,” Bell said in a recent interview, asking not to be photographed head-on because he didn't want any additional exposure as a result of the lawsuit. “I don’t know who’s a good cop and who’s a bad cop.”

Bell said that sentiment lingers, as he has a particular distrust of NYPD officers. Still, the gesture was never meant to cause a disturbance, he added.

“I don’t really view that sort of thing as harmful,” Bell added. “I mean, it’s New York City.”

The suit, which was filed this month, charges police with assault, false arrest and imprisonment and inflicting emotional distress. It also seeks unspecified damages for "pain, suffering, mental anguish and humiliation."

According to the suit, Bell was charged with disorderly conduct for making an “obscene gesture” and causing “public alarm and annoyance.”

But his attorney, Robert Quackenbush, said that at the time of the incident, only one or two people were outside the bar and that Bell’s gesture did not attract attention until he was arrested.

“I’ve never seen a single case in New York saying that a middle finger is an obscene gesture under the disorderly conduct statute,” said Quackenbush, who specializes in civil rights law.

“The police are expected to be able to absorb a certain amount of criticism,” he added. “The targets of this gesture didn’t see it. It was just about squashing dissent.”

The case against Bell was ultimately dismissed late last year when the officer who filed the police report failed to show up in court to testify.
http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20120726/greenwich-village/man-arrested-for-giving-cops-finger-says-it-was-joke

Digitus Impudicus: "The middle finger and the law"
 by Ira Robbins.

The middle finger is one of the most common insulting gestures in the United States. The finger, which is used to convey a wide range of emotions, is visible on streets and highways, in schools, shopping malls,and sporting events, in courts and execution chambers, in advertisements and on magazine covers, and even on the hallowed floors of legislatures.Despite its ubiquity, however, a number of recent cases demonstrate that those who use the middle finger in public run the risk of being stopped, arrested, prosecuted, fined, and even incarcerated under disorderly conduct or breach-of-peace statutes and ordinances.

This Article argues that, although most convictions are ultimately overturned on appeal, the pursuit of criminal sanctions for use of the middle finger infringes on First Amendment rights, violates fundamental principles of criminal justice, wastes valuable judicial resources, and defies good sense. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that speech may not be prohibited simply because some may find it offensive. Criminal law generally aims to protect persons, property, or the
state from serious harm. But use of the middle finger simply does not raise these concerns in most situations, with schools and courts as the exceptions.

Read more:  
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/03/middlefinger.pdf
  
Michigan Supreme Court upholds right to insult meter maids.

A former Michigan State University (MSU) law student last week beat the system after taking a case arising out of a parking ticket before the state's highest court. Jared Rapp, arguing on his own behalf, convinced the justices that the ordinance used to convict him was unconstitutional.

A district court judge slapped Rapp with an $873 fine, a mandatory anger management course, 80 hours of community service and two years of probation because Rapp yelled at MSU meter maid Ricardo Rego who had issued a ticket to Rapp on September 16, 2008. Rapp pulled up to Rego and demanded to know whether he was responsible for the citation. Rego called campus police who arrived 15 minutes later, eventually charging Rapp with violating MSU Ordinance 15.05.

"No person shall disrupt the normal activity or molest the property of any person, firm, or agency while that person, firm, or agency is carrying out service, activity or agreement for or with the university," the ordinance states.

Rapp based his case on the 1987 US Supreme Court case Houston v. Hill which found unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment a municipal ordinance that made it a crime to interrupt a police officer. The justices in that case stated police should not be given the ability to arrest individuals for words or conduct that offend them. A majority of the Michigan justices found the MSU ordinance was even broader in scope than the Houston ordinance.

"Like the ordinance that the United States Supreme Court invalidated in Hill, the verbal disruptions that the MSU ordinance criminalizes are not limited to those containing fighting words or obscene language," Justice Diane M. Hathaway wrote for the Michigan court majority. "Instead, the MSU ordinance explicitly criminalizes any disruption of the normal activity of persons or entities carrying out activities for or with MSU. Not only does the ordinance fail to limit the types of disruptions that are prohibited, it also protects a much broader class of individuals than the ordinance at issue in Hill."

The majority pointed out that other statutes already prohibit physical assault, so the MSU ordinance in large part criminalizes speech. Rapp did lose his argument that the state should pay the costs he incurred defending himself against a prosecution based on an unconstitutional statute. The justices found no statutory basis for awarding such costs in a criminal case.

Two justices dissented from the opinion striking down the MSU ordinance, arguing the Hill case was completely different because it made it unlawful to "interrupt" a police officer whereas the MSU ordinance used the word "disrupt."
http://thenewspaper.com/news/38/3860.asp

Michigan v. Rapp: http://thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2012/mi-insult.pdf

Excerpt taken from Michigan v. Rapp:   In Hill, the United State Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an ordinance that made it unlawful to “in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt” a police officer.(17)
The Court concluded at the outset that this language prohibited verbal interruptions and, therefore, implicated constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment.The Court first noted that the ordinance was not limited in any way to fighting words or obscene language.Instead, the ordinance imposed a blanket prohibition on speech that interrupts an officer in any manner.Expressly clarifying that the Constitution prohibits making such speech a crime, the Court explained that “the freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.”While the Court acknowledged the difficulty of drafting precise laws, it reiterated that it would invalidate those laws “that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them.”
17.)Hill, 482 US at 455. The full text of the ordinance in Hill made it “unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making an arrest.” Id. However, only the portion of the ordinance making it unlawful to “oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt” an officer was enforceable because the remaining language making it unlawful to “assault” or “strike” a police officer was preempted by the Texas Penal Code. Id. at 460.

Hill, 482 US at 462-463. The prevalence of daily ordinance violations alone does not make the law constitutionally suspect; rather, what makes the law constitutionally suspect is the prevalence of violations that encompass protected speech and the threat of selective enforcement of the ordinance against that protected speech.

Man arrested by police after he swore at them can sue.

Washington, D.C. - A man who claims several cops harassed and arrested him over his use of "mild profanity" during a casual conversation with his police officer friend can seek punitive damages, a federal judge ruled.

Mahinder Singh says his former close friend and police officer Raj Dohare "became extremely incensed" over Singh's use of profanity in his presence. Singh says the two were "casually conversing" in Singh's apartment when Dohare became upset and "stated that although he had been plaintiff's friend, he would now 'become his worst enemy.'"

Officer Dohare harassed Singh in abuse of his authority, baselessly citing law and falsely accusing him of crimes, according to the complaint. Then Dohare and two colleagues on the force allegedly wrote Singh five bogus traffic tickets and arrested the man for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, making threats and assaulting an officer.

Singh says he was acquitted on all charges by a judge who pointed out in open court that Dohare was not credible. His complaint against the Metropolitan Police Department, the district and the three cops seeks damages for emotional distress and civil rights violations.

U.S. District Judge Rudolph Contreras found Tuesday that Singh's claims over two of the traffic tickets could not stand, but he said the remaining claims fall within the statute of limitations and cannot be dismissed for inadequate notice.

Singh can also seek punitive damages for common-law violations, the court ruled.

"Indeed, according to the plaintiff's allegations, not only did the district ignore the plaintiff's pleas for help, but it vigorously prosecuted him for the false charges levied by the defendant officers," Contreras wrote. "It thus appears that the plaintiff has alleged enough facts to plausibly show that the district engaged in a 'willful disregard of his rights.'"
 http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/08/09/49157.htm
 
Sing v. District of Columbia: http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/08/09/copswear.pdf